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We obtain suﬃcient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium pair for a particular
constrained generalized game as an application of a best proximity pair theorem.
1. Introduction
Consider the following game involving n players. For the ith player a pair (Xi,Yi) of strat-
egy sets is associated. Knowing the choice of strategies xi ∈ Xi =∏nj=1, j =iXj of all other
players, the ith-player choice is restricted to Ai(xi) ⊆ Yi. Otherwise the choice will be
made from Xi. According to these preferences, let fi : Yi ×Xi → R be the payoﬀ func-
tion associated with the ith player for each i = 1, . . . ,n. In this situation, it is natural to
expect an optimal approximate solution which will fulfill the requirement to some ex-
tent. Therefore, it should be contemplated to find a pair (x, y) where x ∈ X =∏ni=1Xi and
y ∈ Y =∏ni=1Yi which will behave like an equilibrium point of a generalized game, that
is, yi ∈ Ai(xi) and maxz∈Ai(xi) fi(z,xi)= fi(yi,xi) for each i= 1, . . . ,n, and satisfy the opti-
mization constraint, namely, the distance between x and y is minimum with respect to
X and Y . In this case, the pair (x, y) is called an equilibrium pair and the game is termed
as constrained generalized game. Indeed, in this paper, suﬃcient conditions for the ex-
istence of an equilibrium pair for this constrained generalized game are obtained as an
application of a best proximity pair theorem.
The entire edifice of game theory expounds with a mathematical search to strike an
optimal balance between persons generally having conflicting interests. Each player has
to select one from his fixed range of strategies so as to bring the best outcome according
to his own preferences.
Following the pioneering work of Debreu [1], the generalized game is one in which
the choice of each player is restricted to a subset of strategies determined by the choice of
other players. Mathematically, the situation is described as follows.
Let there be n players. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be nonempty compact convex sets in a normed
linear space F. LetXi be the strategy set and let fi : X =
∏n
i=1Xi→R be the payoﬀ function
for the ith player, for each i= 1, . . . ,n. Given the strategies xi of all other players, the choice
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of the ith player is restricted to the set Ai(xi)⊆ Xi. An equilibrium point in a generalized




















A point x of X whose ith coordinate is xi and xi ∈ Xi is written as (xi,xi).
The above definition of the equilibrium point is a natural extension of the Nash equi-
librium point introduced by Nash in [6].
Since then a number of generalizations for the existence of an equilibrium point have
been given in various directions. For instance, the existence results of equilibria of gen-
eralized games were given by Ding and Tan [2], Tan and Yuan [13], Ionescu Tulcea [4],
Lassonde [5], and so forth. For a unified treatment on the study of the existence of equi-
libria of generalized games in various settings, we refer to Yuan [15].
On the other hand, consider the following economic situation. Suppose that goods are
manufactured and sold in diﬀerent locations. Each location can be both a manufacturing
as well as a selling unit. It is agreed that the ultimate place where the goods get sold would
be determining the payoﬀ for the goods. Let there be n such locations. For each location,
two strategiesXi andYi are associated, one to that of manufacturing unit and other to that
of selling unit. Knowing the manufacturing strategy xi of all other locations, the choice
of selling strategy at the ith location is restricted to Ai(xi)⊆ Yi. Also, let fi : Yi×Xi → R
be the payoﬀ associated with the ith location. Moreover, the cost involved in the travel of
goods to diﬀerent places should also be taken into account. In this situation, one cannot
expect an equilibrium point as the strategy setsXi andYi may be quite diﬀerent. In view of
this stand point, it is natural to expect a pair of points (x, y), where x ∈ X =∏ni=1Xi and
y ∈ Y =∏ni=1Yi, which will fulfill the requirement as in the case of equilibrium point of a
generalized game and also minimize the traveling cost where the traveling cost is denoted
by ‖x− y‖. Therefore, it is contemplated to find a pair of points (x, y) where x ∈ X and











and ‖x− y‖ = d(X ,Y), where
d(X ,Y)= Inf {‖a− b‖ : a∈ X , b ∈ Y}. (1.4)
In this case, the pair (x, y) is called an equilibrium pair for this economic situation
which is newly termed as constrained generalized game.
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If the sets Yi coincide with Xi for i = 1, . . . ,n, then Y = X and it is easy to see that
the equilibrium pair boils down to a single point x which is an equilibrium point for a
generalized game in the sense of Debreu [1].
In this paper, an existence of an equilibrium pair for this constrained generalized game
is obtained. For this, a best proximity pair theorem exploring the suﬃcient conditions
which ensure the existence of an element x ∈ A such that
d(x,Tx)= d(A,B) (1.5)
is obtained in Section 3 for the given nonempty subsets A and B of a normed linear space
F and a Kakutani multifunction T : A→ 2B. This result is applied to obtain the existence
of an equilibrium pair of the constrained game in Section 4. Indeed, an existence theorem
for equilibrium point of a generalized game due to Debreu [1] is obtained as a corollary.
2. Preliminaries
This section covers the preliminaries and the results that are required in the sequel.
Let X and Y be nonempty sets. A multivalued map or multifunction T from X to Y
denoted by T : X → 2Y is defined to be a function which assigns to each element of x ∈ X
a nonempty subset Tx of Y . Fixed points of the multifunction T : X → 2X will be the
points x ∈ X such that x ∈ Tx.
Let X and Y be any two topological spaces. Let T : X → 2Y be a multivalued map.
The map T is said to be upper semicontinuous (resp., lower semicontinuous) if T−1(A) :=
{x ∈ X : T(x)∩A = ∅} is closed (resp., open) in X whenever A is a closed (resp., open)
subset of Y . Also T is said to be continuous if it is both lower semicontinuous and upper
semicontinuous.
A multifunction T : X → Y is said to have compact values if for each x ∈ X , T(x) is
compact subset of Y . Also, T is said to be a compact multifunction if T(X) is a compact
subset of Y .
It is known that if T is an upper semicontinuous multifunction with compact values,
then T(K) is compact whenever K is a compact subset of X if X is Hausdorﬀ.
A multifunction T : X → 2Y is said to be a Kakutani multifunction [5] if the following
conditions are satisfied:
(1) T is upper semicontinuous;
(2) either Tx is a singleton for each x ∈ X (in which case Y is required to be a Haus-
dorﬀ topological vector space) or for each x ∈ X , Tx is a nonempty, compact,
and convex subset of Y (in which case Y is required to be a convex subset of a
Hausdorﬀ topological vector space).
The collection of all Kakutani multifunctions from X to Y is denoted by(X ,Y).
A multifunction T : X → 2Y from a topological space X to another topological space Y
is said to be a Kakutani factorizable multifunction if it can be expressed as a composition
of finitely many Kakutani multifunctions.
The collection of all Kakutani factorizable multifunctions from X to Y is denoted by
C(X ,Y).
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If T = T1T2 ···Tn is a Kakutani factorizable multifunction, then the functions T1,
T2, . . . ,Tn are known as the factors of T . It is a noteworthy fact that T need not be convex
valued even though its factors are convex valued.




a∈A : ‖a− x‖ = d(x,A)} (2.1)
is the set of all best approximations in A to any element x ∈ X .
It is known that if A is compact and convex subset of X , PA(x) is a nonempty compact
convex subset of A and the multivalued map PA is upper semicontinuous on X .
A single-valued function f : X →R is said to be quasiconcave if the set
{
x ∈ X : f (x)≥ t} (2.2)
is convex for each t ∈R.
3. Best proximity pair theorem
Consider the fixed point equation Tx = x where T is a nonself operator. If this opera-
tor equation does not have a solution, then the next attempt is to find an element x in a
suitable space such that x is close to Tx in some sense. In fact, a classical best approxima-
tion theorem, due to Fan [3], states that if K is a nonempty compact convex subset of a
Hausdorﬀ locally convex topological vector space E with a continuous seminorm p and








Later, this result has been generalized by Sehgal and Singh [10, 11] to the one for
continuous multifunctions. It is remarked that they have also proved the following gen-
eralization of the result due to Prolla [7].
If K is a nonempty approximately compact convex subset of a normed linear space X ,
T : K → X amultivalued continuousmap with T(K) relatively compact, and g : K → K an
aﬃne, continuous, and surjective single-valued map such that g−1 sends compact subsets







In the setting of Hausdorﬀ locally convex topological vector spaces, Vetrivel et al.
[14] have established existential theorems that guarantee the existence of a best approx-
imant for continuous Kakutani factorizable multifunctions which unify and generalize
the known results on best approximations.
The known example [11] shows that the requirement of continuity assumption of the
involved multifunction in Sehgal and Singh’s result [11] cannot be relaxed.
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if a = 0,
the line segment joining (0,1) and (1,0) if a= 0. (3.3)
Then T is upper semicontinuous but not lower semicontinuous. Also it is clear that there
is no x ∈ K such that
d(x,Tx)= d(Tx,K). (3.4)
Remark 3.2. In [12], the above known example has not been quoted correctly. Example
1.1 of [12] should be replaced by the above example.
On the other hand, even though a best approximation theorem guarantees the ex-
istence of an approximate solution, it is contemplated to find an approximate solution
which is optimal. The best proximity pair theorem (see [9]) sheds light in this direction.
Indeed a best proximity pair theorem due to Sadiq Basha and Veeramani [8] provides
suﬃcient conditions that ensure the existence of element x0 ∈ A such that d(x0,Tx0) =
d(A,B) where the given T : A→ 2B is a Kakutani factorizable multifunction defined on
the suitable subsets A and B of a topological vector space E. The pair (x0,Tx0) is called a
best proximity pair of T . The best proximity pair theorem seeks an approximate solution
which is optimal.
The following fixed point theorem, due to Lassonde [5], for Kakutani factorizablemul-
tifunctions will be invoked to establish the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.3 (Lassonde [5]). If S is a nonempty convex subset of a Hausdorﬀ locally convex
topological vector space, then any compact Kakutani factorizable multifunction T : S→ 2S
(i.e., any compact multifunction in the familyC(S,S)) has a fixed point.
Let A and B be any two nonempty subsets of a normed linear space. Before stating the
principal result of this section, the following notions are recalled:
d(A,B) := Inf {d(a,b) : a∈A, b ∈ B},
Prox(A,B) := {(a,b)∈ A×B : d(a,b)= d(A,B)},
A0 :=
{
a∈A : d(a,b)= d(A,B) for some b ∈ B},
B0 :=
{
b ∈ B : d(a,b)= d(A,B) for some a∈ A}.
(3.5)
If A = {x}, then d(A,B) is written as d(x,B). Also, if A = {x} and B = {y}, then d(x, y)
denotes d(A,B) which is precisely ‖x− y‖.
The following best proximity pair theorem [8] which will be used to prove the exis-
tence of an equilibrium pair is included for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 3.4. Let A and B be nonempty compact convex subsets of a normed linear space X
and let T : A→ 2B be an upper semicontinuous multifunction. Further assume that for each
x in A, Tx is a nonempty closed convex subset of B and T(A0)⊆ B0.
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Then there exists an element x ∈A such that
d(x,Tx)= d(A,B). (3.6)
Proof. Consider the metric projection map PA : X → 2A defined as
PA(x)=
{
a∈A : ‖a− x‖ = d(x,A)}. (3.7)
As A is a nonempty compact convex set, PA(x) is a nonempty closed, convex subset of
A, for each x in A. Also it is well known that PA is an upper semicontinuous multivalued
map.
Now, it is claimed that PA(Tx)⊆ A0, for each x in A0.
Let y ∈ PA(Tx). Then y ∈ PA(z), for some z ∈ Tx. This implies that ‖x− y‖ = d(z,A).
But it is given that T(A0) ⊂ B0. Hence z ∈ B0. But z ∈ B0 implies that there exists a ∈ A
such that ‖a− z‖ = d(z,A). Now
‖z− y‖ = d(z,A)≤ ‖z− a‖ = d(A,B). (3.8)
This implies that ‖z− y‖ = d(A,B). Hence y ∈ A0. Consequently, PA(Tx)⊆ A0, for each
x in A0.
Since A and B are compact sets, A0 = ∅. Also it is easy to prove that A0 is compact and
convex. Now, for x in A0, PA(Tx) need not be a convex set. Here, the fixed point theorem
of Lassonde [5] is invoked. Though PA ◦T is not a convex-valued multifunction, PA ◦T :
A0 → 2A0 is a Kakutani factorizable multifunction. Hence, by the fixed point theorem of
Lassonde, there exists x ∈A0 such that x ∈ PA(Tx).
Now, x ∈ PA(Tx) implies that ‖x− y‖ = d(y,A), for some y ∈ Tx. Then Tx ⊆ B0 im-
plies that there exists a∈A such that ‖a− y‖ = d(A,B). Hence
‖x− y‖ = d(y,A)≤ ‖y− a‖ = d(A,B). (3.9)
Therefore ‖x− y‖ = d(A,B). As d(x,Tx)≤ ‖x− y‖ = d(A,B), hence d(x,Tx)= d(A,B).
This proves the theorem. 
Remark 3.5. In [8], the above theorem is proved in more general setup where the set A is
approximately compact and T is a Kakutani factorizable multifunction.
4. Constrained generalized game
This section is devoted to principal results on game theory.
The following lemma is an important tool in the proof of Theorem 4.4. For the proof,
we refer to [12].
Lemma 4.1. Let A and B be nonempty compact subsets in a normed linear space F and let
f : A×B→R be a continuous function. Given a continuous multifunction T : A→ 2B with
compact values, the function g : A→R defined by g(x)= δ(Tx,x) :=maxz∈T(x) f (z,x) is a
continuous function.
The proof of the principal theorem of this section invokes the best proximity pair
theorem (Theorem 3.4). Before that, the following definitions are introduced.
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Let X1, . . . ,Xn and Y1, . . . ,Yn be nonempty compact convex sets in a normed linear





x ∈ X : ‖x− y‖ = d(X ,Y) for some y ∈ Y}. (4.1)
Definition 4.2. Let fi : Yi ×Xi → R, for i = 1, . . . ,n, be n single-valued functions. These
n functions are said to satisfy a condition (A) with respect to the given multifunctions























for each i= 1, . . . ,n, (4.2)
there exists a∈ X such that ‖a− y‖ ≤ d(X ,Y).
Definition 4.3. Let the single-valued functions fi : Yi×Xi→R and themultifunctionsAi :
Xi→ 2Yi , for i= 1, . . . ,n, be given. Let x ∈ X and y ∈ Y be such that, for each i= 1, . . . ,n,
(a) yi ∈Ai(xi),
(b) δi(Ai(xi),xi) :=maxz∈Ai(xi) fi(z,xi)= fi(yi,xi),
(c) ‖x− y‖ = d(X ,Y).
Then the pair (x, y) is called an equilibrium pair for the game which is termed as con-
strained generalized game.
Theorem 4.4. Let X1, . . . ,Xn and Y1, . . . ,Yn be nonempty compact convex sets in a normed
linear space F. For i = 1, . . . ,n, let fi : Yi × Xi → R be continuous functions satisfying a
condition (A) with respect to the given lower semicontinuous multifunctions Ai : Xi → 2Yi ,
i= 1, . . . ,n, in (Xi,Yi), and are such that for any fixed xi ∈ Xi, the function yi→ fi(yi,xi)
is quasiconcave on Xi for each i= 1, . . . ,n. Then there exist an equilibrium pair for the con-
strained generalized game.





























It is shown that E satisfies all the conditions of Theorem 3.4. For this, it is claimed that
Ei ∈(Xi,Yi), for i= 1, . . . ,n.
Let i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} be fixed. For any fixed xi ∈ Xi, Ei(xi) is nonempty and compact be-
cause the function yi→ fi(yi,xi) is continuous on the compact setAi(xi). Now, it is shown
that Ei(xi) is convex.
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Since yi→ fi(yi,xi) is quasi concave on Xi,
fi
(










But, Ai(xi) is a convex set. So,
fi
(























Hence λz1 + (1− λ)z2 ∈ Ei(xi). Therefore, Ei(xi) is convex for each i= 1, . . . ,n.
Next, it is shown that Ei : Xi → 2Yi is upper semicontinuous multifunction on Xi, for
every i= 1, . . . ,n.
Let zn ∈ Xi with zn→ z and wn ∈ Ei(zn) with wn→w.
The fact wn ∈ Ei(zn) implies the fact that fi(wn,zn) = δi(Ai(zn),zn). By Lemma 4.1,
xi→ δi(Ai(xi),xi) is a continuous function. Therefore, δi(Ai(zn),zn)→ δi(Ai(z),z). More-
over, since fi is a continuous function, fi(wn,zn)→ fi(w,z). This implies that fi(w,z) =
δi(Ai(z),z). Hence w ∈ Ei(z). Therefore Ei is upper semicontinuous on Xi for every i =
1, . . . ,n. Hence this establishes the claim that Ei ∈(Xi,Yi), for i= 1, . . . ,n. Further from
the above claim, it follows that E ∈(X ,Y).
Now, let x ∈ X0 and y ∈ E(x). This implies that fi(yi,xi) = δ(Ai(xi),xi), i = 1, . . . ,n.
Since fi for i = 1, . . . ,n satisfy condition (A) with respect to the multifunctions Ai, there
exists a∈ X such that ‖a− y‖ = d(X ,Y). This illustrates the fact y ∈ Y0. Therefore E(X0)
⊆ Y0. Hence E satisfies all the conditions of Theorem 3.4. Therefore, there exists x ∈ X
such that
d(x,Ex)= d(X ,Y). (4.9)
Since Ex is compact, there exists y ∈ Ex such that
d(x, y)= d(X ,Y). (4.10)
This establishes the theorem. 
If the setsYi’s coincides withXi’s for i= 1, . . . ,n, thenY = X and the following corollary
is immediate.
Corollary 4.5. LetX1, . . . ,Xn be nonempty compact convex sets in a normed linear space F.
Let Ai : Xi → 2Xi , i= 1, . . . ,n, be lower semicontinuous multifunctions in (Xi,Xi). For i=
1, . . . ,n, let fi : X →R be continuous functions such that, for any fixed xi ∈ Xi, the function
yi → fi(yi,xi) is quasiconcave on Xi for each i = 1, . . . ,n. Then there exists an equilibrium
point for the game in the sense of Debreu [1].
Remark 4.6. It is remarked that Theorem 4.4 does not strictly generalize Debreu’s theo-
rem [1] or [5, Theorem 6]. In [5] the sets Xi’s are convex sets with all the multifunctions
Ai’s compact except possibly one in addition to the conditions for Ai’s given in the above
corollary.
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